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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS  
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
Nos. 11-3792 & 11-3868 
_____________ 
 
REGINA S. BAILEY, 
Appellant in 11-3792 
 
v. 
 
JOSEPH GIBBONS; TANYA WOOD; DAVID WATKINS, ESQ.;  
KELLY BURTON ROCCO, ESQ.; PAT PRIANT; RUSSO REALTY;  
THE CITY OF ENGLEWOOD; AN UNKNOWN POLICE WOMAN; 
THORNTON WHITE, Englewood Police Office;  
GONZALEZ, Englewood Police Officer;  
BARRETT, Englewood Lieutenant; 
2 UNKNOWN ENGLEWOOD POLICE OFFICERS 
 
Kelly Burton Rocco, Esq., 
Appellant in 11-3868 
 
_____________ 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civil No. 2:09-cv-4119) 
District Judge: Honorable Katharine S. Hayden 
_____________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
November 14, 2012 
 
Before: RENDELL, FUENTES, and CHAGARES, Circuit Judges  
 
(Opinion Filed: January 3, 2013) 
_____________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT                         
_____________ 
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FUENTES, Circuit Judge: 
Plaintiff Regina Bailey, an elderly, disabled woman, was forced to sell her house 
in Englewood, New Jersey (the “Property”), in which she had resided for over twenty-
five years, as a result of a contentious divorce.
1
  In July of 2007, she hired attorney Kelly 
Rocco to represent her in connection with the sale.  The Property was eventually 
purchased by defendants Joseph Gibbons and Tanya Wood.  Under a sale escrow 
agreement, Bailey had until January 4, 2008 to remove her belongings from the Property.   
On January 7, 2008, Gibbons visited the Property to take possession, but Bailey 
had not moved out.  Bailey believed that the escrow agreement allowed her to stay in the 
Property as long as she paid a daily fee to Gibbons, so she called the police to deal with 
Gibbons.  Police Officer Jamie Gilbert, not a party to this action, responded to the scene 
and told Gibbons she would need a court order to remove Bailey because Gibbons did not 
have the documents proving his ownership of the Property.   Officer Gilbert later filed a 
report regarding the incident, but nothing further came from that encounter. 
A few days later, Bailey was hospitalized for treatment of diabetes.  Upon her 
return to the Property on January 14, 2008, Bailey saw that some of her belongings were 
in a trash bin outside the house and that movers were inside handling and breaking some 
of her other possessions.  Still believing that the escrow agreement permitted her to be in 
                                              
1
 The complete facts of this case are set forth in detail in the District Court’s opinion.  See 
Bailey v. Gibbons, Civ. Action No. 09-4119, 2011 WL 4056202, *1-3 (D.N.J. Sept. 12, 
2011).  We repeat only those necessary to our resolution of this appeal. 
3 
the Property, she entered the house to collect the remainder of her items.  This prompted 
the movers to call Gibbons, who in turn called the police and rushed to the Property.   
Englewood Officers Thornton White and Anthony Gonzalez responded to 
Gibbons’ call and also arrived at the Property.  There, Gibbons told them that he was the 
lawful owner and that Bailey was trespassing.  Gibbons also claims he showed the 
officers his deed of ownership, but Bailey disputes this, contending that the deed of 
ownership was on that day at the county recorder’s office.  In the meantime, Bailey was 
walking around the Property, moving some of her possessions to a neighbor’s lawn.  For 
the most part, she ignored the police officers’ questions and did not show them any 
documentation of ownership.  Officer White summoned Lieutenant Kevin Barrett to the 
scene for help, but none of them succeeded in convincing Bailey to leave the Property.
2
  
Barrett asked Gibbons if he wanted to file a formal complaint against Bailey, and 
Gibbons said that he did.  Barrett therefore instructed White to arrest Bailey, and White 
began to handcuff Bailey by placing her hands behind her back.  Gibbons saw this and 
told the Officers he did not want Bailey arrested, at which point White released Bailey.   
I. 
In January of 2009, Bailey filed suit in New Jersey state court asserting several 
state law claims.  Relevant here are state law tort claims against the Englewood 
Defendants, as well as Bailey’s malpractice claim against her former attorney Kelly 
Rocco, seeking to hold Rocco liable for the damage to Bailey’s belongings as a result of 
                                              
2
 Barrett, White, and Gonzales are referred to herein as the “Officers,” and, together with 
the City of Englewood, New Jersey, as the “Englewood Defendants.” 
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Rocco’s allegedly negligent representation during the sale of the Property and in 
connection with the sale escrow agreement.  The state court dismissed the claims against 
the Englewood Defendants for failure to file a notice of tort claim as required by state 
law.  Thereafter, Bailey amended her complaint to include federal constitutional claims 
against the Englewood Defendants, including claims against the Officers for false arrest 
and false imprisonment, excessive force, and denial of substantive and procedural due 
process, and a Monell claim against Englewood.  The case was removed to federal court. 
After discovery, the District Court for the District of New Jersey granted summary 
judgment to the Englewood Defendants with respect to the federal constitutional claims 
against them, denied Bailey’s cross-motions for summary judgment with respect to such 
claims, and refused to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Bailey’s state law claims.3   
II. 
A. 
We review the District Court’s grant of summary judgment de novo.  Am. Eagle 
Outfitters v. Lyle & Scott Ltd., 584 F.3d 575, 580-81 (3d Cir. 2009).  In the context of a § 
1983 action, we consider the applicability of qualified immunity.  A police officer enjoys 
complete immunity from suit either if his actions did not violate a constitutional right, or 
if his actions did not violate clearly established law known to a reasonable person.  See 
Lamont v. New Jersey, 637 F.3d 177, 182 (3d Cir. 2011).     
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 The District Court had jurisdiction over this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and we 
have jurisdiction over these appeals pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
5 
The District Court held that the Officers were entitled to qualified immunity with 
respect to Bailey’s false arrest and false imprisonment claims because they had probable 
cause to arrest her for trespassing, and thus did not violate any constitutional right.  The  
Court reasoned that Gibbons’ testimony that he was the owner of the Property and the 
fact that he showed the officers a property deed confirming his claim gave the Officers 
probable cause.  Bailey asserts that there was a genuine issue of fact regarding whether 
the Officers could have seen Gibbons’ deed to the Property.   
But even assuming that the Officers mistakenly arrested Bailey solely on the basis 
of Gibbons’ statements that he was the lawful owner, we cannot say that the Officers’ 
conduct violated clearly established law.  It is an open question in this Circuit whether an 
officer has probable cause to arrest an individual for trespassing when that individual is 
involved in a property ownership dispute based exclusively on the statements of the party 
asserting a contrary interest in the property.  While one case in another Circuit implies 
that no probable cause can exist under such circumstances, see, e.g., Radvansky v. City of 
Olmsted Falls, 395 F.3d 291, 310 (6th Cir. 2005), cases in our Circuit suggest that the 
testimony of a single complainant may be sufficient to give the police probable cause to 
arrest an individual for trespass, at least under certain circumstances,  see, e.g., Wright v. 
City of Philadelphia, 409 F.3d 595, 603-04 (3d Cir. 2005).  In this light, we cannot say 
that a reasonable officer in the Officers’ position would have known that they lacked 
probable cause to arrest Bailey solely on the basis of Gibbons’ complaint. 
Bailey points to other facts she contends precluded the Officers from having 
probable cause.  She argues that the escrow agreement gave her the right to be at the 
6 
Property, and that therefore she could not have committed trespass.  But whether Bailey 
actually was trespassing or not is not the relevant inquiry in determining whether the 
Officers had probable cause.  See id.  Bailey also argues that the police report regarding 
the prior incident between Bailey and Gibbons showed that she was the lawful owner and 
thus precluded the Officers from having probable cause, but offered no evidence that the 
Officers knew of the existence of the report.   
With respect to her Monell claims, Bailey has not offered any evidence of an 
Englewood policy or custom that resulted in her injuries, as she is required to do.  See 
generally Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978).  Bailey’s contention 
that Englewood did not investigate the complaint she filed against the Officers as a result 
of this incident falls well short of meeting that requirement. 
  We also conclude that summary judgment was proper with respect to Bailey’s 
substantive due process claims.  Having reviewed the record, and drawing all possible 
inferences in Bailey’s favor, we cannot conclude that the Officers’ behavior in this case 
“shocks the conscience.”  Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846 (1998). 
Finally, we conclude that because it was proper to grant summary judgment to the 
Englewood Defendants with respect to the federal constitutional claims, it was proper to 
deny Bailey’s motion for summary judgment with respect to those same claims.4 
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 Although Bailey does not appear to press on appeal her claims based on excessive force, 
violation of procedural due process, and conspiracy, we have reviewed the record and 
conclude that the District Court correctly granted summary judgment to the Englewood 
Defendants with respect to those claims. 
7 
B. 
Also at issue in this case is an appeal by Bailey’s former real estate attorney, Kelly 
Rocco.  As noted, Bailey’s complaint against Rocco was based on Rocco’s representation 
in connection with the sale of the Property.  However, after the close of fact discovery, 
Bailey submitted an expert report asserting that Rocco was also liable to Bailey for the 
loss of her state law claims against the Englewood Defendants because Rocco had 
allegedly failed to file a notice of claim as required by state law.  See N.J. Stat. Ann. 
§ 59:8-3, 59:8-8.  Rocco promptly moved to amend her answer to assert a third-party 
claim against Bailey’s attorney in the instant case, James Marks, arguing that it is he who 
is responsible for the failure to comply with the notice requirement, and, in the 
alternative, to disqualify him from representing Bailey because he was now a key 
witnesses with respect to Bailey’s claims.  A Magistrate Judge denied Rocco’s motions, 
and Rocco moved the District Court for reconsideration.  The District Court denied the 
motion, which Rocco appeals. 
Rocco argues, inter alia, that it was improper for the District Court to retain 
jurisdiction over Bailey’s state law claim against Rocco by denying Rocco’s motion for 
reconsideration of the Magistrate Judge’s orders.  We agree.  Rocco’s procedural motions 
to bring Bailey’s attorney into the case and disqualify him from representing Bailey may 
alter the substantive outcome of Bailey’s state law claim against Rocco.  Thus, in denying 
Rocco’s motion to reconsider the Magistrate Judge’s rulings denying those motions, the 
District Court exercised jurisdiction over that state law claim.  However, when it 
dismissed Bailey’s federal constitutional claims against the Englewood Defendants, the 
8 
District Court asserted that it “decline[d] to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the 
remainder of Bailey’s claims,” Bailey, 2011 WL 4056202, at *1, and did not explicitly 
consider whether it was proper to retain jurisdiction over the state claim against Rocco by 
ruling on Rocco’s motion for reconsideration.  We review the District Court’s retention 
of jurisdiction over state law claims for abuse of discretion, see Baraka v. McGreevey, 
481 F.3d 187, 210 (3d Cir. 2007).  We conclude that the District Court erred by implicitly 
retaining jurisdiction over the state law claims without considering the relevant factors as 
to whether it was proper to do so. 
The factors relevant to whether it is proper to retain jurisdiction over pendent state 
law claims are, among others, the convenience and fairness to the parties.  See Borough 
of W. Mifflin v. Lancaster, 45 F.3d 780, 788 (3d Cir. 1995).  In this light, we conclude 
that it is not proper to retain jurisdiction over Bailey’s malpractice claim against Rocco.  
As Rocco convincingly argues, discrepancies between the procedural rules of the New 
Jersey State Courts and those of the Federal Rules counsel in favor of having Rocco’s 
procedural motions considered by the court that will ultimately adjudicate the substance 
of the dispute.  Moreover, certain assertions raised by Rocco in her motions, including 
whether Bailey’s attorney must be disqualified as a necessary witness under New Jersey 
Rules of Professional Conduct, turn on interpretation of New Jersey state law.  These 
factors counsel against exercising supplemental jurisdiction over Bailey’s state law 
claims against Rocco. 
We trust that the preclusive effect under New Jersey’s procedural rules, if any, of 
the Magistrate Judge’s rulings on Rocco’s motions will be properly considered by the 
9 
New Jersey State Court that adjudicates Rocco’s motions, should she choose to renew 
them before that Court. 
III. 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s grant of summary 
judgment to the Englewood Defendants with respect to Bailey’s federal constitutional 
claims against them, and vacate the District Court’s order denying Rocco’s motion to 
reconsider the Magistrate Judge’s ruling. 
